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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires every complaint to 
―contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.‖
1
  In a 2007 antitrust case, Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,
2
 the Supreme Court held that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 
plaintiff to plead ―enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.‖
3
  This Article will refer to this determination as the 
plausibility inquiry.  In 2009, the Supreme Court‘s Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
opinion confirmed that Twombly articulated a general standard of 
pleading that applied outside of the antitrust context.
4
 
What followed these cases was a deluge of criticism: ―[The 
Twombly holding] marks a fundamental—and unjustified—change in the 
character of pretrial practice‖;
5
 ―[T]he court‘s majority messed up the 
federal rules‖;
6
 ―Notice pleading is dead.  Say hello to plausibility 
pleading‖;
7
 ―[Twombly represents] an untenable interpretation of Rule 
8(a) that is wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent . . . ‖;
8
 
―[T]oday, federal pleading standards are in crisis, thanks to [Twombly 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal]‖;
9
 ―Twombly and Iqbal have introduced a wild 
card . . . at the threshold stage of civil process through which all 
litigation must pass‖;
10
  ―[Twombly and Iqbal] have destabilized the 
entire system of civil litigation‖;
11
 ―The majority view among academics 
has been that robust efforts to regulate at the pleading stage are 
wrongheaded and inconsistent with the traditional pleading standard the 
Court has followed since Conley.‖
12
 
 
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 570. 
 4. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). 
 5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 6. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 
2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html?_r=1 (quoting 
statement by Justice Ginsburg). 
 7. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) 
 8. Id. at 460. 
 9. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295. 
 10. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 859. 
 11. Id. at 823. 
 12. Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire:  What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us about Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B. U. L. REV. 1217, 1225 
(2008). 
2
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In this Article, I argue that much of this criticism is unjustified
13
 
because it overlooks the analytical steps that occur before the plausibility 
inquiry.  Under a proper reading of Twombly and Iqbal, the plausibility 
inquiry is not always necessary, and even when necessary, should be an 
inquiry of last resort.
14
  Additionally, commentators have generally 
failed to appreciate the significant case management authority district 
judges possess under the Federal Rules to help along a factually 
deficient claim.
15
 
I develop this reading of Twombly and Iqbal more fully below by 
providing a three-step framework for courts to apply when confronted 
with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).
16
  Properly applied, this three-step process will ameliorate 
many, but not all, of the criticisms of Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
 13. Professor Robert Bone has reached a similar conclusion about the Twombly case.  Robert 
G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877 
(2009) (―[T]he Supreme Court‘s decision in Twombly does not alter pleading rules in as drastic a 
way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose.‖).  Although I agree with 
Professor Bone‘s characterization of the case, I arrive at this conclusion for different reasons.  
Professor Bone reached this conclusion before the Supreme Court decided the Iqbal case.  It should 
be noted, however, that Professor Bone has written critically about Iqbal.  Robert G. Bone, 
Plausibility Pleading Revised:  A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849. 
  The actual impact of Twombly appears to have been more muted than some had expected.  
See Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?  A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic 
Corp v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (conducting a 
study of Twombly‘s impact and concluding that the case ―appears to have had almost no substantive 
impact,‖ except in civil rights cases where the impact ―does show a significant departure‖) 
(emphasis added); but see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 460 (noting that 
―plausibility pleading is likely to stymie many valid claims . . .‖); Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296 
(noting that ―Twombly‘s approach to pleading has been widely criticized as . . . having destructive 
policy consequences in terms of litigants‘ access to federal courts‖).   
 14. Professor Adam Steinman makes a similar conclusion in his article 
on Twombly and Iqbal on which this Article will heavily comment.  See Steinman, supra note 
9.  Professor Steinman correctly notes that ―when a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations 
on every element of a claim for relief, the plausibility issue vanishes completely.‖  Id. at 1316.  This 
leads to his conclusion that Twombly and Iqbal ―cannot faithfully be read to make a lack of 
‗plausibility‘ grounds for disregarding a complaint‘s allegations.‖ Id. at 1319.  I will argue, 
however, that in some cases a plaintiff cannot plead a non-conclusory allegation on every element 
of a claim for relief.  For this reason, in some cases—e.g., cases where a defendant‘s state of mind is 
an element of the claim for relief—Twombly and Iqbal require a court to engage in the plausibility 
analysis.  Twombly and Iqbal do make a lack of ―plausibility‖ grounds for dismissing a claim when 
(1) an element of that claim cannot be alleged with a non-conclusory allegation or (2) a plaintiff has 
not alleged an element of a claim with a non-conclusory allegation. 
 15. In making this argument, I will draw heavily on Professor Hartnett‘s piece on the two 
decisions and make some small additions.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After 
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010).  This argument goes against the grain of most academic 
commentary on Twombly and Iqbal. 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  Even if the critics of the Twombly and Iqbal cases do not agree 
with my premise that the plausibility inquiry is a limited one, those critics should still support the 
3
Brown: Reconstructing Pleading
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
 1268 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1265 
Although critics have generally failed to appreciate the limited role 
of the plausibility inquiry, it is still necessary in some cases.  I will 
therefore, in the discussion of plausibility within the three-step 
framework, provide a general defense of Twombly and Iqbal by 
recasting the decisions in light of a plaintiff‘s burden to certify to a court 
that the factual contentions in a complaint ―will likely have evidentiary 
support‖
17
 under Rule 11.  Under this view of the plausibility inquiry, a 
court acts as a neutral third-party that simply evaluates a plaintiff‘s 
ability to predict her own likelihood of success.  Instead, a court 
engaging in the plausibility inquiry gauges whether the plaintiff has 
accurately predicted that his or her claim ―will likely have evidentiary 
support.‖
18
 
To give a proper context to these arguments, I will begin in Part I 
by providing a very short introduction to pleading practice before the 
Supreme Court‘s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.  In Part II, I will then 
describe the Twombly and Iqbal cases in detail.  After providing this 
introductory discussion, I will proceed in Part III to develop the 
arguments outlined above before briefly concluding in Part IV with a 
short summary. 
II.  PLEADING PRACTICE BEFORE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
This section will begin with the seminal Supreme Court 
pronouncement on pleading, Conley v. Gibson,
19
 and then will then 
move to discuss three more recent cases of Conley‘s progeny.
20
 
A. Conley v. Gibson, No Set of Facts, and the Importance of Notice 
In Conley, a group of recently fired African-American railroad 
workers brought suit against a union that was responsible for 
 
proposed framework because it helps to ensure that the plausibility inquiry is made in a transparent 
manner. 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P 11(b). 
 19. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  Conley is a prevalent enough authority on pleading that Justice 
Stevens referred to the retirement of its language as ―rewrit[ing] the Nation‘s civil procedure 
textbooks.‖  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Scott Dodson, Essay, 
Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2007) (noting 
that in Twombly, the Supreme Court ―gutted the venerable language from Conley[] that every civil 
procedure professor and student can recite almost by heart‖). 
 20. For a much more informative and thorough discussion of the history and development of 
pleading practice in federal courts before Twombly and Iqbal, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
4
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representing them.
21
  As interpreted at the time, the Railway Labor Act
22
 
made it unlawful for a union representing members of a craft to make 
distinctions among members of the union based on ―irrelevant and 
invidious‖ grounds.
23
  When the plaintiffs‘ employer purported to 
―abolish‖ their positions, each had lost their job.
24
  Plaintiffs alleged that 
the employer then filled the abolished positions with all white workers, 
excepting ―a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old 
jobs but with loss of seniority.‖
25
 
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant union ―did nothing to protect 
them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them 
protection comparable to that given white employees.‖
26
  Plaintiffs filed 
their suit seeking to compel the defendant union to ―represent them 
fairly.‖
27
  The defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ claims under 
Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to ―set forth specific 
facts to support its general allegations.‖
28
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Supreme Court 
began by stating the ―accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.‖
29
  In finding the complaint sufficient, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that ―specific facts‖ 
 
 21. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
 22. 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 
 23. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) 
[I]t is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to represent a craft and 
to make contracts as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the 
authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on such 
relevant differences.  Here the discriminations based on race alone are obviously 
irrelevant and invidious. 
Id. 
 24. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  Professor Sherwin has explained that, at the time, ―unions negotiating employment 
contracts with the railroad could not bargain for discriminatory terms, although there was no law 
directly prohibiting railroads from discriminating against black employees.‖  Emily Sherwin, The 
Jurisprudence of Pleading:  Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L. J. 73, 88 (2008). 
 27. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
 28. Id. at 47. 
 29. Id. at 45-46; see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 435-36 (noting that ―[t]he 
immediate effect of Conley was to put an end to the murmurs of opposition to the new pleading 
standard of the Federal Rules and to clarify that yes, the new liberal rules mean what they say.‖). 
  Some have suggested that this language was ―rarely‖ taken literally.  See Steinman, supra 
note 9, at 1321 (quoting Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986) (―How can a court ever be certain that a 
plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him to relief?‖)). 
5
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must support ―general allegations‖ in a complaint.
30
  According to the 
Court, ―all the Rules require is ‗a short and plain statement of the claim‘ 
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.‖
31
  The Supreme Court also 
emphasized that the pleadings should not be read in a hyper technical 
manner, and that decisions should be made on the merits: ―The Federal 
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the 
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on 
the merits.‖
32
 
As Justice Stevens observed in his Twombly dissent, since Conley, 
the Supreme Court had cited the no-set-of-facts language ―in a dozen 
opinions . . . and four separate writings.‖
33
  And ―[i]n not one of those 
16 opinions was the language ‗questioned,‘ ‗criticized,‘ or ‗explained 
away.‘‖
34
  Before Twombly, then, the no-set-of-facts language appeared 
to have been fairly solid precedent.
35
 
 
 30. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 31. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 32. Id. at 48 (citing Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)).  This notion of 
pleading has been called the ―liberal ethos.‖  See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM L. REV. 433, 439 (1986); see also 
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 228 (2004) (arguing that ―the 
system of pleading should not unduly interfere with decisions on the merits‖).  Professor Spencer 
has suggested that Twombly may be ―a death blow to the liberal, open-access model of the federal 
courts espoused by the early twentieth century law reformers.‖  Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 
supra note 7, at 433.  Spencer terms the new pleading practice as the ―‗restrictive‘ or ‗efficiency-
oriented‘ ethos.‖  Id. 
 33. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 
U.S. 813, 818 (2002)); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999); Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 
(1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New 
Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hospital 
Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 521 (1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422 (1969) (plurality opinion); 
see also Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 554 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561, n.1 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Simon v. 
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55, n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 34. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577-78. 
 35. But see Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13 at 897 (―Long before the 
Twombly decision, lower federal courts in the 1980s responded to this sense of crisis by tightening 
up on pleading requirements.  And they continued in this vein despite Supreme Court decisions to 
the contrary in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.‖) (citations removed); id. at 890 (noting that lower 
courts, ―enthusias[tic] for heightened pleading . . . found ways to get around Leatherman and 
Sweirkeiwicz‖). 
6
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B. After Conley:  Prohibiting Heightened Pleading Per Se 
Since Conley, the Supreme Court has decided three additional 
important cases on pleading under Rule 8(a): Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
36
 Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema,
37
 and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.
38
  I will briefly 
explain each below. 
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit 
decision that had expressly imposed a ―heightened pleading standard‖ 
for cases alleging a § 1983 violation against a municipality.
39
  The 
Supreme Court rejected the heightened pleading standard as ―impossible 
to square . . . with the liberal system of ‗notice pleading‘ set up by the 
Federal Rules.‖
40
  In reaching this conclusion, the Court echoed 
Conley‘s focus on ―fair notice.‖
41
  The Court additionally observed that 
the Federal Rules had explicitly singled out those cases where 
heightened pleading was necessary in Rule 9(b) (cases alleging ―fraud or 
mistake‖),
42
 and a § 1983 claim against a municipality was not among 
the claims listed in Rule 9(b).
43
  The Court also emphasized that the 
Fifth Circuit‘s heightened pleading standard was problematic because it 
would have effected an amendment to the Federal Rules by judicial 
interpretation.
44
 
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court continued to abjure the use of 
heightened pleading outside of those cases listed in Rule 9.
45
  There, the 
 
 36. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 37. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 38. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 39. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164. 
 40. Id. at 168. 
 41. Id. at 168 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 43. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (noting Rule 9(b) and stating the familiar Latin axiom:  
―[e]xpressio unius est exclusion alterius‖). 
 44. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69. 
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b).  But that is a 
result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by 
judicial interpretation.  In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and litigants 
must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious 
claims sooner rather than later. 
Id.  Critics of the Twombly case have noted the importance of this language.  See, e.g., Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 453-54 (―[T]he rule amendment process is preferable because 
it is a much more democratic, transparent, and accountable method of making changes to the 
Federal Rules.‖). 
 45. Sweirkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Leatherman‘s language 
rejecting heightened pleading standards by judicial interpretation).  Professor Spencer suggests that 
the Sweirkiewicz case was necessary because ―lower courts continued to impose heightened 
7
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lower court had required the plaintiff in an employment discrimination 
case to plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to 
dismiss.
46
  In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that, in the context of 
a case for employment discrimination, ―[t]he prima facie case . . . is an 
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.‖
47
  The burden-
shifting evidentiary standard of the prima facie case in employment 
discrimination claims was inapplicable in the pleading context: 
Before discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be 
difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie 
case in a particular case.  Given that the prima facie case operates as a 
flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid 
pleading standard for discrimination cases.
48
 
The Supreme Court characterized the lower court‘s requirement of 
pleading the prima facie case as a ―heightened pleading standard,‖ and, 
like in Leatherman, the Court rejected its use.
49
  The Court again 
reemphasized that ―[t]h[e] simplified notice pleading standard relies on 
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.‖
50
 
In the third important case, Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme 
Court began a slight break from the liberal attitude to pleading evinced 
in Conley, Leatherman, and Sweikerwicz.
51
  There, the plaintiffs had 
brought a class action for securities fraud against Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
alleging that the company had ―falsely claimed that it expected the FDA 
would soon grant its approval‖ of one of its products, a new asthmatic 
spray device.
52
  The plaintiffs, in claiming that they were damaged by 
the false statement, stated: ―In reliance on the integrity of the market, 
[the plaintiffs] paid artificially inflated prices for Dura securities and the 
plaintiffs suffered damage[s] thereby.‖
53
 
 
pleading in many cases.‖  Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 437-38 (citing 
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1011-59 (2003) 
(describing cases)). 
 46. Sweirkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509. 
 47. Id. at 510. 
 48. Id. at 512. 
 49. Id. at 511. 
 50. Id. at 512 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)); Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).  Professor Bone 
suggests that the Twombly Court‘s skepticism of district judge case management as panacea for 
discovery burdens ―may be the most important part of the Twombly opinion—perhaps even more 
important than the discussion of Conley.‖  Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 898. 
 51. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 52. Id. at 339. 
 53. Id. at 340 (emphasis removed) (internal quotations removed). 
8
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In moving to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ complaint, the defendant argued 
that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an economic loss or ―a 
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the 
loss.‖
54
  The Court agreed and held that the plaintiffs‘ allegation that 
they ―suffered damage[s]‖ was insufficient.
55
 
According to the Court, an artificially inflated purchase price did 
not necessarily show a loss or cause a loss even when the securities were 
resold later at a lower price.
56
  The artificially high price did not show a 
loss because ―the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a 
share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.‖
57
 
The Court read the plaintiffs‘ complaint as attempting to support 
the ―suffered damage[s]‖ allegation by pleading that the share price was 
artificially inflated at the time of the sale.
 58 
 The blanket allegation of 
damages supported by an allegation of an inflated purchase price was, 
however, insufficient.
59
  This was true even though the inflated price 
may ―‗touch upon‘ a later economic loss,‖ and ―will sometimes play a 
role in bringing about a future loss.‖
60
  The inflated purchase price, 
without more, was insufficient to state a claim for economic loss.
61
  The 
Court suggested, however, that the plaintiffs could have saved their 
complaint by ―claim[ing] that [defendant]‘s share price fell significantly 
after the truth became known.‖
62
 
To summarize: After Conley, the function of the complaint was to 
―merely ‗give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.‘‖
63
  The Court reemphasized the 
 
 54. Id. at 342. 
 55. Id. at 348. 
 56. Id. at 347. 
 57. Id. at 342 (emphasis in original). 
 58. Id. at 347 (―The complaint‘s failure to claim that Dura‘s share price fell significantly after 
the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price 
inflation alone sufficient.  The complaint contains nothing that suggests otherwise.‖). 
 59. Id. at 346. 
 60. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 347. 
 63. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1321 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see 
also Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 434 (―Since the enactment of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in 1938, notice pleading has been the watchword for the system of pleading in 
federal civil courts.‖); see also id. at 438 (noting that before Twombly and Iqbal, ―whether the 
possibility of recovery is likely or remote was rendered irrelevant; what mattered was whether the 
statement of the claim gave the defendant ‗fair notice‘ of the claim and its basis.‖); Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (―Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a 
judge‘s disbelief of a complaint‘s factual allegations.‖); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(noting that dismissal is not appropriate even it appears ―that a recovery is very remote and 
unlikely‖). 
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importance of notice pleading in Leatherman and Sweikerwicz.  In Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, a bridge between Conley and Twombly, the Court 
began scaling back on Conley‘s liberal language on pleading. 
III.  TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
Twombly and Iqbal discuss pleading and the motion to dismiss in 
different terms than in previous cases.  Briefly, Twombly and Iqbal 
describe two new ―lines‖ that a plaintiff must ―cross[]‖ to sufficiently 
plead a claim for relief: (1) ―the line between the conclusory and the 
factual‖; and (2) ―the line between ―the factually neutral and the 
factually suggestive.‖
64
  Below, I will describe these two lines and the 
Twombly and Iqbal opinions in detail.  I will then make the argument 
that this new terminology does not change pleading practice as much as 
commentators have assumed. 
A. Twombly:  The Line between the Factually Neutral and the 
Factually Suggestive 
As the Supreme Court did in deciding Twombly, before proceeding 
to the legal analysis, it is necessary to provide some background on the 
Twombly case.
65
  The history of this litigation can be traced all the way 
back to the 1984 divestiture of AT&T‘s local telephone business.  The 
divestiture had generated a great deal of litigation and the Supreme 
Court had itself confronted issues stemming from the divestiture several 
times.
66
 
In 1984, AT&T‘s local telephone business was divided up into to 
regional service monopolies called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 
(ILECs).
67
  Congress, however, became displeased with the operation of 
the regional monopolies, and eventually enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,
68
 which imposed on the ILECs ―a 
host of duties intended to facilitate market entry‖
69
 for competitors.
70
  
As the Court had explained, ―‗[c]entral to the [new] scheme [was each 
 
 64. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007). 
 65. This background will be lifted from Justice Souter‘s majority opinion in Twombly.  See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-52. 
 66. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; see also 
Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 67. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.  The ILECs have also been called ―Baby Bells.‖  Id. 
 68. 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 69. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371. 
 70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549. 
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ILEC‘s] obligation . . . to share its network with competitors.‘‖
71
  The 
competitors were known as ―competitive local exchange carriers‖ 
(CLECs).
72
  In enacting this legislation, Congress had apparently 
―expected some ILECs to become CLECs in the legacy territories of 
other ILECs,‖ but this never occurred.
73
 
Despite that 1996 Act, then, the CLECs failed to achieve 
meaningful competition with the ILECs, and the ILECs failed to 
meaningfully compete with each other.
74
  The plaintiffs in Twombly 
brought a class action complaint alleging that ILECs engaged in a 
―contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce‖ in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
75
  The complaint 
alleged conduct directed at demonstrating two separate conspiracies: (1) 
a conspiracy among the ILECs to inhibit the growth and market entry of 
the CLECs in the same ways (the ―no-market-entry-for-CLECs 
conspiracy‖); and (2) a conspiracy among the ILECs to refrain from 
competing with each other (the ―no-competition-among-ILECs 
conspiracy‖).
76
 
According to Justice Souter, writing for the majority, the plaintiffs 
did not ―directly allege illegal agreement; in fact, they proceed[ed] 
exclusively via allegations of parallel conduct, as both the District Court 
and Court of Appeals recognized.‖
77
  The Court made this conclusion 
despite the plaintiffs‘ allegation that ―[d]efendants . . . engaged in a 
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . . 
[and] agree[d] not to compete with one another and to stifle attempts by 
others to compete with them.‖
78
  The Court read this allegation as a 
 
 71. Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402) (alterations in original).  The ILECs ―vigorously 
litigated the scope of the [new] sharing obligation.‖  Id. at 549.  As a result of this litigation, the 
FCC ―three times revised its regulations to narrow the range of network elements to be shared with 
the CLECs.‖  Id. at 549-50 (citing Covad Communications, 450 F.3d at 533-34). 
 72. Id. at 549. 
 73. Id. at 569 (―The upshot is that Congress may have expected some ILECs to become 
CLECs in the legacy territories of other ILECs, but the disappointment does not make a conspiracy 
plausible.‖). 
 74. Id. at 551. 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (making unlawful ―[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations‖); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551. 
 76. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51. 
 77. Id. at 565 n.11, 564 (―[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim 
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement 
among the ILECs.‖).  This explains the somewhat tortured language I use below to describe the 
plaintiffs‘ allegations. 
 78. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 n.2 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 
64), Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220) 
[hereinafter Twombly Complaint]). 
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―legal conclusion[] resting on the prior allegations.‖
79
  Finding that no 
agreement had been directly alleged, the Court focused on the 
allegations that the plaintiffs pleaded that tended to suggest an 
agreement.
80
 
As to the no-market-entry-for-CLECs conspiracy, the plaintiffs 
alleged that this conspiracy could be seen by the ILECs ―parallel 
conduct‖ that ―included making unfair agreements with the CLECs for 
access to ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the 
networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the 
CLECs‘ relations with their own customers.‖
81
  According to the 
plaintiffs, the ILECs‘ ―‗compelling common motivation[n]‘‖ to thwart 
the CLECs‘ competitive efforts naturally led them to form a 
conspiracy.‖
82
 
As to the no-competition-among-ILECs conspiracy, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the ILECs failed to meaningfully pursue attractive business 
opportunities in adjacent markets where they would have had substantial 
competitive advantages.
83
  Additionally, the plaintiffs noted that Richard 
Notebaert, an ILEC CEO, stated in an interview that competing in the 
residual territory of an ILEC ―might be a good way to turn a quick dollar 
but that doesn‘t make it right.‖
84
  The majority held that, despite these 
allegations, the complaint did not contain ―enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that [wa]s plausible on its face.‖
85
 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority began by first examining 
the requirements necessary to prove a § 1 claim.
86
  Previously, the Court 
had held that, at the summary judgment stage, ―a § 1 plaintiff‘s offer of 
conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the possibility that the 
defendants were acting independently.‖
87
  At the summary judgment 
stage, then, a plaintiff must show more than parallel business conduct 
and more than ―even ‗conscious parallelism‘‖
88
 because this activity 
does not tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting 
independently.  Noting that the sufficiency of allegations at the pleading 
 
 79. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. 
 80. Id. at 565. 
 81. Id. at 550-51. 
 82. Id. at 551 (quoting Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 50 (alteration in original)). 
 83. Id. (citing Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 40-41). 
 84. Id. at 551 (quoting Twombly Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 42). 
 85. Id. at 570. 
 86. Id. at 553. 
 87. Id. at 554. 
 88. Id. at 553-54 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 227 (1993)). 
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stage is an ―antecedent question‖ to the sufficiency of proof at trial and 
at summary judgment, the Court held that to state a claim under § 1, ―a 
complaint [must allege] with enough factual matter (taken as true) to 
suggest that an agreement was made.‖
89
  The Court noted that the 
―‗crucial question‘ [wa]s whether the challenged anticompetitive 
conduct stem[med] from independent decision or from an agreement, 
tacit or express.‖
90
 
According to the Court, though, the factual matter pleaded by the 
plaintiffs did not suggest an agreement.
91
  As to conduct pleaded to infer 
the no-market-entry-for-CLECs agreement, the Court noted that, 
―nothing in the complaint intimate[d] that the resistance to the upstarts 
was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC 
intent on keeping its regional dominance.‖
92
  As to the conduct pleaded 
to infer no-competition-among-ILECs agreement, the court noted that ―a 
natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former 
Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their 
neighbors to do the same thing.‖
93
 
The Court rejected the inference of an agreement that the plaintiffs 
drew from their allegations.
94
  According to the Court, the allegations in 
the complaint failed to cross the line between the factually neutral and 
the factually suggestive and were therefore not plausible.
95
  In a 
footnote, the Court noted that, in addition to the line between factually 
neutral and factually suggestive covered in Twombly, to plausibly state a 
claim for relief, the allegations in the complaint must also cross ―the line 
between the conclusory and the factual.‖
 96
 
 
 89. Id. at 556. 
 90. Id. at 553 (quoting Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 
U.S. 537, 540 (1953)). 
 91. Id. at 566. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 568.  Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the majority in this sense for ―engag[ing] 
in arm-chair economics.‖  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 569. 
 95. Id.  But see Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 446-47. 
Under the traditional rule, factual allegations that were consistent with liability passed 
muster because courts were required to draw any permissible inferences in the plaintiff's 
favor, permissible here meaning those inferences simply consistent with the stated 
allegations.  Thus, in the Twombly case, the courts should have been able—at the 
pleading stage—to infer from parallel conduct and the lack of competition among the 
ILECs, coupled with the statement of one of the ILEC presidents regarding the 
impropriety of such competition, that there was some agreement among the ILECs to 
restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 
Id. 
 96. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5. 
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After Twombly, there was still some ―hope‖ among those criticizing 
the case that it ―might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust 
cases.‖
97
  Justice Stevens, writing in dissent in Twombly, wondered 
―[w]hether the Court‘s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust 
treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a 
complaint w[ould] inure to the benefit of all civil defendants.‖
98
  This 
question was answered in Iqbal, where the Supreme Court definitively 
stated: ―Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 
‗all civil actions.‘‖
99
  
B. Iqbal:  The Line between the Conclusory and the Factual 
The Iqbal case addressed the line noted, but left unaddressed in 
Twombly: the line between the conclusory and the factual.  As in the 
discussion of Twombly, a brief background discussion will help to frame 
the legal issues.  The Iqbal case involved the September 11 attacks and 
the FBI investigation that followed:  ―The September 11 attacks were 
perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves 
members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group.  
Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—
and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples.‖
100
 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, ―the FBI questioned more 
than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in particular or to 
terrorism in general.‖
101
  Following this questioning, ―some 762‖ of the 
individuals were held on immigrations charges, and 184 of those held on 
immigration charges ―w[ere] deemed to be of high interest to the 
investigation.‖
102
  Once an individual was determined to be of high 
interest, the individual was ―held under restrictive conditions designed to 
prevent . . . communicati[on] with the general prison population or the 
outside world.‖
103
 
In Iqbal, the plaintiff was one of the individuals that was arrested 
on immigration charges and was also one of the individuals designated 
as ―of high interest.‖
104
  Because he was deemed to be ―of high interest,‖ 
he was placed in a high security housing unit, the Administrative 
 
 97. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296. 
 98. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 99. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 100. Id. at 1951. 
 101. Id. at 1943. 
 102. Id. at 1943. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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Maximum Special Housing Unit (―ADMAX SHU‖).
105
  While housed in 
ADMAX SHU, the plaintiff was: (1) ―kicked . . . in the stomach, 
punched . . . in the face, and dragged . . . across his cell without 
justification‖;
106
 (2) ―subjected . . . to serial strip and body-cavity 
searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others‖;
107
 and (3) 
refused the opportunity, along with other Muslims to pray and was told 
that there would be ―[n]o prayers for terrorists.‖
108
  The plaintiff brought 
a complaint against numerous federal officers, including John Ashcroft, 
the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, 
the Director of the FBI.
109
 
Only defendants Ashcroft and Mueller, however, were before the 
Supreme Court in Iqbal and the Court accordingly focused specifically 
on the allegations in the complaint connecting either Ashcroft or Mueller 
to Iqbal‘s alleged harsh treatment.
110
  The plaintiff pleaded: 
 In the months after September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men, designated 
herein as post-September 11th detainees, as part of its investigation of 
the events of September 11. 
. . . 
 The policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the 
FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in 
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001. 
. . .  
 Defendants ASHCROFT [and] MUELLER . . . each knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to 
these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of their religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest.
111
 
 
 105. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 106. Id. at 1944. (internal quotations omitted). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 109. Id. at 1942. 
 110. Id. at 1944 (―The allegations against [Ashcroft and Mueller] are the only ones relevant 
here.‖).  Although ultimately dismissing the claims against Ashcroft and Mueller, the Court noted 
that ―[Iqbal‘s] account of his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional 
misconduct by some governmental actors.  But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these 
actors are not before us here.‖  Id. at 1942. 
 111. Complaint at ¶¶ 47, 69, 96, Ashcroft v. Elmaghraby, No. 04 CV 01809 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 27, 
2005) [hereinafter Iqbal Complaint]. 
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In identifying Ashcroft as a Defendant, the plaintiff described him 
as having ―ultimate responsibility for the implementation and 
enforcement of the immigration and federal criminal laws.  He [wa]s a 
principal architect of the policies and practices challenged [in the 
complaint].‖
112
  The plaintiff described Mueller as being ―instrumental 
in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies and 
practices challenged [in the complaint].‖
113
 
In analyzing the complaint, the Court began by observing that the 
Twombly Court ―found it necessary first to discuss the antitrust 
principles implicated by the complaint.‖
114
  Following course, the Court 
stated it would ―begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials 
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.‖
115
  The Court then 
described Iqbal‘s complaint for ―invidious discrimination in 
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments,‖ as a claim under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.
116
  A Bivens action is 
an implied cause of action against federal officials for a violation of a 
constitutional right.
117
  The cause of action is ―disfavored,‖
118
 and the 
Court has therefore ―been reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‗to any new 
context or new category of defendants.‘‖
119
  Where Bivens does apply, it 
―is the ‗federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.‘‖
120
 
The Court explained that, for a Bivens claim, ―the plaintiff must 
plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory 
purpose.‖
121
  To prove a discriminatory purpose, though, a plaintiff must 
show more than ―‗intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences.‘‖
122
  A plaintiff must show that a defendant adopted a 
course of action ―‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ [the action‘s] 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.‖
123
  Accordingly, the Court 
stated, the plaintiff ―must plead sufficient factual matter to show that 
 
 112. Id. ¶ 10. 
 113. Id. ¶ 11. 
 114. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 115. Id.  (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007)). 
 116. Id. at 1948. 
 117. Id. at 1947. 
 118. Id. at 1948. 
 119. Id. (quoting Correctional Service Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 
 120. Id. (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)). 
 121. Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-41 (1993)); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
 122. Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass v. Freeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 123. Id. (quoting Freeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (alternation in original). 
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[Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention policies 
at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of 
discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.‖
124
 
Before proceeding to determine if the plaintiff‘s complaint crossed 
the line between factually neutral and factually suggestive,
125
 the Court 
discussed the line between the conclusory and the factual mentioned in a 
footnote in Twombly: ―In keeping with these principles a court 
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying 
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.‖
126
  The Court noted that it had 
followed this practice in Twombly:  the Twombly Court ―first noted that 
the plaintiffs‘ assertion of an unlawful agreement was a ‗legal 
conclusion‘ and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth.‖
127
 
The Court excised the following allegations from the complaint: 
 ―[Ashcroft] is a principal architect of the policies and practices 
challenged here.‖128 
 
 ―[Ashcroft] . . . knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject Plaintiffs to these conditions of confinement as a 
matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or 
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.‖129 
Most important was the Court‘s rejecting the allegations that 
Ashcroft and Mueller ―willfully . . . agreed to subject [Plaintiffs] to 
harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account 
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin.‖
130
  Recall that to recover 
on a Bivens action, a violation of a constitutional right does not equal 
intent; the plaintiff must prove that the motivation behind the violation 
was discriminatory.
131
 
The Court then noted the allegations that it found well-pleaded: 
 
 124. Id. at 1948-49.  An interesting note about the phrasing in Iqbal is the focus on opening the 
doors to discovery, rather than opening the doors to the district courts.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 
(―Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of 
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 
than conclusions.‖); cf. Phillips v. Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (―Few issues in civil 
procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that opens 
access to courts.‖). 
 125. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007). 
 126. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 127. Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 128. Id. at 1944; id. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111 ¶ 10. 
 129. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 96. 
 130. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 131. Id. at 1948. 
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 ―In the months after September 11, 2001, the [FBI], under the 
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of 
Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of 
September 11.‖132 
 
 ―The policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‗cleared‘ by the 
FBI was approved by [Ashcroft and Mueller] in discussions in the 
weeks after September 11, 2001.‖133 
Having distilled the complaint down to its well-pleaded allegations, 
the Court moved to the plausibility analysis.  In a statement that has 
generated much controversy following Iqbal, the Court noted that, 
―whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.‖
134
  The majority searched the 
complaint for ―any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest 
[Ashcroft‘s and Mueller‘s] discriminatory state of mind.‖
135
 
Of the remaining, non-conclusory allegations, only two spoke to the 
discriminatory state of mind: the 1000s-of-arrests allegation and the 
hold-until-cleared-discussions allegation.  On the 1000s-of-arrests 
allegation, the Court found that the ―disparate, incidental impact on Arab 
Muslims‖ was not enough to state a plausible claim that Ashcroft and 
Mueller subjected the plaintiff to the harsh conditions because he was a 
Muslim.
136
  As to the hold-until-cleared-discussions allegation, the 
Court found that ―[a]ll it plausibly suggests is that the Nation‘s top law 
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, 
sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions 
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.‖
137
 
On this point of plausibility—i.e., whether the majority‘s cherry-
picked allegations plausibility suggested discriminatory intent—the 
Court was unanimous.
138
  Writing for the remaining four Justices in 
dissent, Justice Souter stated: ―I agree that the two allegations selected 
 
 132. Id. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 47. 
 133. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 69. 
 134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. at 1952. 
 136. Id. at 1951 (―It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would 
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.‖). 
 137. Id. at 1952. 
 138. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
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by the majority, standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to 
relief for unconstitutional discrimination.‖
139
 
For the purposes of this Article then,
140
 the disagreement in Iqbal 
was solely over the majority‘s disregarding of certain allegations as 
conclusory.  Justice Souter read the complaint as suggesting that 
Ashcroft and Mueller ―helped to create the discriminatory policy [the 
plaintiff] has described.‖
141
  The disagreement, then, is whether 
plaintiff‘s statement that Ashcroft was the ―principal architect‖
142
 of a 
policy that subjected plaintiff to the harsh conditions of confinement 
―solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin‖
143
 was 
conlcusory or factual.  This disagreement will be explained more fully 
below. 
To summarize:  After Twombly and Iqbal, in adjudicating a motion 
to dismiss, the two crucial questions are (1) whether the allegations have 
crossed the line between the conclusory and the factual, and (2) whether 
the allegations have crossed the line between the factually neutral and 
the factually suggestive. 
To guide courts in answering these questions, I will below describe 
a three-step process gleaned from Twombly and Iqbal that will provide 
methodological consistency.  This approach will also relegate the 
plausibility inquiry to its proper role as an inquiry of last resort, and will 
ensure that, if necessary, the plausibility inquiry will be done 
transparently.  This reading demonstrates that many of the criticisms of 
Twombly and Iqbal are overstated.  Additionally, in discussing the 
plausibility inquiry, the final of the three steps, I will provide new 
interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal in light of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 and suggest again that much of the criticism of the two 
cases is overstated. 
IV.  THE THREE-STEP PROCESS 
Briefly, in adjudicating a motion to dismiss, a court should: (1) 
identify the elements of a claim that a plaintiff will ultimately need to 
prove on the legal theory that a defendant seeks to have dismissed; (2) 
excise from the complaint conclusory allegations; and (3) determine 
whether the remaining non-conclusory allegations directly allege each 
 
 139. Id.  
 140. Justice Souter in dissent also strongly disagreed with the majority‘s legal analysis of the 
requirements for a Bivens claim.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 141. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 142. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 10. 
 143. Id. ¶ 96 (emphasis added). 
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element of the claim, and if not, determine whether the non-conclusory 
allegations that indirectly allege an element of a claim suggest more than 
a possibility that the plaintiff will be able to prove his or her claim. 
A. The Elements of the Cause of Action 
Exactly how a court should define the elements of a cause of action 
at the pleading stage has received relatively little scholarly attention.
144
  
Professor Charles Campbell, however, has suggested that a plaintiff 
must plead ―factual allegations in plain language touching (either 
directly or by inference) all material elements necessary to recover under 
substantive law.‖
145
  I agree with Professor Campbell:  Under Twombly 
and Iqbal a plaintiff must plead factual matter that speaks to each 
element of a claim for relief.  This statement seems obvious, but is 
confused by the Sweirkeiwicz case, where the Supreme Court held that a 
plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case to survive a motion to 
dismiss.
146
  A close reading of Sweirkeiwicz, however, reveals that the 
holding is not inconsistent with requiring a plaintiff to plead to each 
element of a claim for relief. 
Before the Sweirkeiwicz case, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, the Supreme Court outlined the plaintiff‘s evidentiary burden at 
the summary judgment stage and referred to this as a prima facie case.
147
  
The Court required a plaintiff to show ―(1) membership in a protected 
group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse 
employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of 
discrimination.‖
148
 
In rejecting the Fifth Circuit‘s requirement that a plaintiff to plead 
each of these four elements, the Court noted that the prima facie case 
requirements were an ―evidentiary standard‖
149
 that ―set forth the basic 
 
 144. Professor Spencer has previously touched on this.  Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra 
note 7, at 487 (―To the extent that Twombly endorses parity between the level of scrutiny applied to 
claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 stages—with the only distinction being that between alleged 
facts and evidenced facts—such a development is unwelcome.‖). 
 145. Charles B. Campbell, A ‘Plausible’ Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 
NEV. L. J. 1, 22 (2008).  Professor Emily Sherwin, however, has argued that ―no one maintains that 
plaintiffs must specify the elements of a legal cause of action in their complaints.‖  Emily Sherwin, 
The Jurisprudence of Pleading:  Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L. J. 73, 75 (2008). 
 146. Sweirkeiwicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (―This Court has never indicated that 
the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the 
pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.‖). 
 147. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 148. Sweirkeiwicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 
 149. Id. (―In McDonnell Douglas, this Court made clear that ‗[t]he critical issue before us 
concern[ed] the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment 
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allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII 
case alleging discriminatory treatment.‖
150
  Once a plaintiff presented 
enough evidence to establish a prima facie case, this created a 
―presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the 
employee.‖
151
 
But, to prove employment discrimination, a plaintiff does not 
always need to present circumstances that support an inference of 
discrimination.  Instead, as the Sweirkeiwicz Court noted, ―if a plaintiff 
is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail 
without proving all the elements of a prima facie case.‖
152
 
In Sweirkeiwicz, the Court referred to the requirement of pleading a 
prima facie case as a ―heightened pleading standard‖ that ―conflict[ed] 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).‖
153
  As Campbell notes, 
―Swierkiewicz rejected using an evidentiary standard as a pleading 
standard; it did not reject measuring the sufficiency of a complaint by 
whether it alleged all of the elements necessary to recover.‖
154
  Indeed, 
the Court rejected the prima-facie-case pleading standard because it 
required pleading more than all of the elements necessary to recover.
155
 
Additionally, the material-elements pleading requirement is 
consistent with the Supreme Court‘s unanimous opinion in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals.  There, in determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff‘s 
complaint, the Court first examined what a plaintiff would ultimately 
―need to prove.‖
156
  The Court identified all the elements necessary to 
succeed on a securities fraud action, and found that the plaintiff failed to 
plead two of them: ―what the relevant economic loss might be or of what 
the causal connection might be between that loss and the 
misrepresentation.‖
157
  Because the plaintiff had failed to ―giv[e] any 
 
discrimination.‘‖) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800) (alteration and emphasis in 
Sweirteiwicz). 
 150. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981). 
 151. Id. at 254. 
 152. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511. 
 153. Id. at 512. 
 154. Campbell, supra note 149 at 23.  Moore‘s Federal Practice suggests that ―[t]he Supreme 
Court had rejected the idea that courts should measure a pleading‘s adequacy by the elements of a 
claim.‖ 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 8.04[1a] (3d ed. 2010).  John 
P. Lenich, however, says that ―[t]he authors [of Moore‘s Federal Practice] are wrong.‖  John P. 
Lenich, Notice Pleading Comes to Nebraska:  Part I—Pleading Claims for Relief, NEB. LAW., Sept. 
2002, at 2, 7 n.12. 
 155. Sweirkeiwicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
 156. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
 157. Id. at 347. 
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indication of the economic loss and proximate cause,‖
158
 the Court held 
that the complaint was insufficient.
159
 
When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, as the Court did in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Twombly, and Iqbal, a court should begin the analysis 
by identifying the minimum elements a plaintiff must prove to recover 
on the cause of action for which the defendant seeks dismissal.  A court 
only needs to complete this process on those particular legal theories on 
which the defendant seeks to foreclose the plaintiff‘s recovery.  This first 
step in the three-step process existed before Twombly and Iqbal and 
should therefore be unobjectionable to those critical of the plausibility 
inquiry.  Additionally, determining the elements of a claim is a legal 
question, which is proper at the pleading stage.
160
 
B. Defining Conclusory 
After defining the elements of the cause of action on which the 
defendant seeks dismissal, a court should closely examine the complaint 
and excise those allegations that are conclusory.
161
  Defining conclusory 
is a difficult task, partly because the Federal Rules attempted to move 
away from the language of ―facts,‖ ―ultimate facts,‖ and ―conclusions‖ 
with Rule 8(a)‘s short-plain-statement language.
162
  Indeed, the drafters 
of Rule 8 ―intentionally avoided any reference to ‗facts‘ or ‗evidence‘ or 
‗conclusions.‘‖
163
 
Because this line between the conclusory and the factual appears to 
have been drawn (or at least received significant attention) for the first 
time in Iqbal, its definition must be found there.  As noted above in the 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 438. 
 160. One potential problem, however, with this approach is that it may increase the workload 
of courts because it requires courts to identify the legal elements of the claim.  I contend, however, 
that based on Dura Pharmaceuticals, this was already the practice in federal courts—if a plaintiff 
does not plead any allegation that speaks to a claim for relief, the court should dismiss the claim.  
The proposed approach here simply asks courts to make the identification of the elements of a cause 
of action more systematically. 
 161. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (instructing courts to ―begin by identifying pleadings that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.‖).    
 162. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 891 (―[N]ineteenth-century judges 
applied the code rules in a hyper-technical fashion, insisting on ‗strict and logical accuracy‘ and 
drawing hopeless distinctions among allegations of ultimate fact, legal conclusions, and evidentiary 
facts.‖) (citations omitted). 
 163. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (―The substitution 
of ‗claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief‘ for the code formulation of the ‗facts‘ 
constituting a ‗cause of action‘ was intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes among 
‗evidentiary facts,‘ ‗ultimate facts,‘ and ‗conclusions‘ . . . .‖)). 
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description of Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had failed 
to adequately allege that Ashcroft and Mueller intentionally formulated 
the plan of restrictive confinement to subject the plaintiff to his 
mistreatment in confinement because of some discriminatory animus.
164
  
Importantly, the Court noted that it did not disregard the allegations 
because they were ―unrealistic or nonsensical.‖
165
 
In this process, the Court excised from the complaint the allegation 
that ―ASHCROFT [and] MUELLER . . . willfully . . . agreed to subject 
[Iqbal] to the[] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest,‖
166
 and the allegation that Ashcroft was 
the ―principal architect‖
167
 of the policy and Mueller was 
―instrumental‖
168
 in carrying it out.  The Court characterized these as 
―bald allegations‖ and found them not well-pleaded.
169
 
In contrast, the Court found as non-conclusory the allegations that 
(1) ―[i]n the months after September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men, designated herein 
as post-September 11th detainees, as part of its investigation of the 
events of September 11,‖
170
 and (2) ―[t]he policy of holding post-
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement 
until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants 
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after 
September 11, 2001.‖
171
 
Justice Souter, writing in dissent in Iqbal, faulted the majority‘s 
analysis on this point saying, ―[b]y my lights, there is no principled basis 
for the majority‘s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and 
Mueller to their subordinates‘ discrimination.‖
172
 
So the question becomes: what is the difference between the 
allegations that the Court held conclusory and those allegations that the 
Court found well-pleaded? 
 
 164. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 165. Id. at 1951. 
 166. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111 ¶ 96; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 167. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 10; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 168. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 11; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 169. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 170. Iqbal Complaint, supra note11, ¶ 47; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 171. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 69; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 172. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
23
Brown: Reconstructing Pleading
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
 1288 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1265 
1. Elements of a Claim that are only Indirectly Perceptible 
Professor Steinman has provided a definition of the line between 
the conclusory and the factual: ―an allegation is conclusory only when it 
fails to identify adequately the acts or events (or, one might say, the 
transactions or occurrences) that entitle the plaintiff to relief from the 
defendant.‖
173
 
I suggest a similar, although not identical, definition.  An allegation 
in a complaint is conclusory when the allegation attempts to plead 
directly an element of a claim that is only indirectly sensory-perceptible.  
By sensory perceptible, I mean capable of being perceived by any of the 
five senses.  To illustrate, I provide several examples, none of which is 
entirely conclusory: 
1. Defendant fired Plaintiff because she was a woman. 
2. During a performance review, Defendant stated that clients have 
complained about doing business with a woman. 
3. Plaintiff heard Defendant make a joke and laugh when she exited 
the room. 
4. Defendant failed to use gender-neutral language in his intra-
office memoranda. 
5. Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to women which 
he demonstrated by his constant telling of sexist jokes in the 
office. 
In allegation one, the Defendant‘s firing of the Plaintiff is sensory 
perceptible.  An employer cannot fire an individual without some 
sensory perceptible action—a phone call that the individual can hear, or 
a letter that an individual can see and read.  In allegations two, the 
Defendant‘s statement is sensory-perceptible by hearing; likewise in 
allegation three.  In allegation four, the use of the pronouns could have 
been seen while Defendant was at his desk typing, or could have been 
seen by reading the memoranda.  Allegation five is sensory-perceptible 
because the jokes could be heard. 
But parts of allegations one and five are not directly sensory 
perceptible—these are the allegations that state the Defendant‘s motive 
for the firing.  A motivation cannot be directly perceived; it can only be 
perceived indirectly.  One can only know an individual‘s state of mind 
 
 173. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1298.  Professor Spencer, although not addressing the issue 
in the same way, has suggested that a non-conclusory allegation is one ―of observed or experienced 
objective facts about what transpired.‖ (emphasis added).  A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding 
Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009). 
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through those sensory-perceptible actions that tend to evince motivation.  
Allegations two through four are all examples of sensory-perceptible 
allegations that can evince the Defendant‘s intent. 
It is important to note, though, that in the hypothetical complaint, 
combining a sensory-perceptible allegation with an imperceptible 
allegation does not transform the latter into a non-conclusory allegation.  
This is true even if the plaintiff says that the sensory-perceptible 
allegation demonstrates the imperceptible element.  For example, in 
allegation five, the allegation about the sexist jokes is sensory-
perceptible and therefore well-pleaded.  But the ―because-of‖ part of the 
allegation—that ―Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to 
women‖—is not directly perceptible.  The Plaintiff‘s linking of these 
two allegations in a single paragraph, and suggesting that the jokes prove 
the intent, does not transform the allegation on the Defendant‘s state of 
mind into a non-conclusory allegation.  This rule can be lifted from 
Dura Pharmaceuticals.  There, the plaintiffs alleged damages and the 
court read the complaint as linking the allegation of an artificially 
inflated price (which is a directly sensory-perceptible fact) with the 
damages.
174
  The Court nonetheless held that the allegation was 
insufficient.
175
  As further support, in Papasan v. Allain,
176
 the Court 
noted that ―[a]lthough for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we 
must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not 
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation.‖
177
 
This definition of conclusory described above can be seen in Iqbal.  
There, a meeting between Ashcroft and Mueller where they 
―discussed‖
178
 the policy of the restrictive conditions of confinement 
could have been seen and heard.  Ashcroft‘s intention in implementing 
the policy, that he did it ―solely on account of their religion, race, and/or 
national origin,‖
179
 however, is only indirectly perceptible.  One can try 
to understand Ashcroft‘s intent by what one hears him saying, or what 
one sees him doing, but one cannot perceive what his motivation is. 
It is important to note that a plaintiff cannot always avoid the 
plausibility inquiry by simply pleading sensory-perceptible allegations 
 
 174. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
 177. Id. at 286. 
 178. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 69. 
 179. Id. ¶ 96. 
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on each of the elements of a cause of action.
180
  Some elements cannot 
be pleaded directly with sensory-perceptible allegations.  When a statute 
or common law rule makes intent an element of a claim, a plaintiff 
cannot directly plead that element with a non-conclusory allegation. 
Again, this can be seen in Iqbal.  There, the plaintiff pleaded a non-
conclusory allegation—the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab 
Muslim men after September 11: ―[T]he [FBI], under the direction of 
Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim 
men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.‖
181
  
This is a sensory-perceptible allegation that tends to show Mueller‘s and 
Ashcroft‘s state of mind.  Although the plaintiff did not explicitly allege 
the connection between the two, the plaintiff‘s failure to explicitly make 
the connection did not cause the allegation to fail.
182
  Conversely, a 
plaintiff‘s explicitly connecting the two should not make the allegation 
sufficient.  Similarly, in the Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court read the 
complaint as the plaintiff making this connection, but this was still not 
enough.  Again, whether a claim is well-pleaded should not turn on the 
plaintiff‘s artfully connecting a non-conclusory allegation with an 
element of a claim that cannot be directly pleaded—this type of 
hypertechnical rule is a result that the Federal Rules sought to avoid.
183
 
The only way to plead intent is to provide the court with sensory-
perceptible allegations that indirectly speak to the element.  When a 
cause of action requires as an element some level of intent—or some 
other element that is not itself directly sensory-perceptible—the plaintiff 
must plead around this requirement with other sensory-perceptible 
allegations. 
2 Directly Perceptible Elements that are Pleaded Indirectly 
Twombly, however, necessitates a second part of the definition of 
conclusory.  An allegation in a complaint is also conclusory when the 
plaintiff pleads an element that is directly sensory perceptible, but pleads 
the element as though it has not been directly perceived.  An agreement 
or a conspiracy is a directly-perceptible element: a handshake, an oral 
assent, or even a wink and a nod that is the assent to the agreement.  But, 
 
 180. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316 (―But a complaint that does provide non-conclusory 
allegations on every element of a claim, by definition, exceeds the threshold of plausibly suggesting 
an entitlement to relief for purposes of Iqbal step two.‖) (emphasis added). 
 181. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 47. 
 182. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009). 
 183. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). 
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according to the Court in Twombly, the plaintiffs did not state a claim 
even though they alleged that: 
Beginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and continuing to the 
present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and 
their co-conspirators engaged in a contract, combination or conspiracy 
to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or 
high speed internet services markets by, among other things, agreeing 
not to compete with one another and to stifle attempts by others to 
compete with them and otherwise allocating customers and markets to 
one another in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.
184
 
The Court found that the plaintiffs were not proceeding on an 
allegation of direct agreement: ―[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that 
plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not 
on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs.‖
185
  
The allegations of the ―agreement‖ in Twombly were not describing 
some directly perceptible fact—instead they were reciting the element of 
the cause of action, and were pleaded as only indirectly perceptible. 
To make this distinction clear, I suggest that the plaintiffs would 
have stated a claim had they alleged that:   
1.  [T]he CEOs of each of the [ILECs] reserved a private room at a 
high-priced restaurant in Bermuda in January 1996, and then alleged a 
second-by-second transcript of exactly what was said by whom at the 
meeting as they hatched their conspiratorial regime.
186
 
With this hypothetical allegation, the plaintiffs would have pleaded the 
agreement as a directly perceptible allegation.  The Court, despite being 
skeptical that any of the plaintiffs were in that room, and without the 
plaintiffs producing any documents (such as minutes from the meeting), 
would have had to accept this allegation as true—the allegation is non-
conclusory. 
What is important is whether the plaintiffs were alleging the 
agreement as a recitation of the elements of the cause of action or were 
directly alleging the agreement.  In other words, just because an element 
of a claim (e.g., an agreement) can be directly sensory perceptible does 
not mean that any time the allegation is used in the complaint it will be 
used as sensory perceptible.  A complaint can allege a conspiracy but 
 
 184. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551 n.2 (2007). 
 185. Id. at 564. 
 186. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1318 n.149 (using the hypothetical pleading to argue that 
Twombly and Iqbal cannot be read to require evidentiary support for non-conclusory allegations at 
the pleading stage). 
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really plead it as an indirectly perceptible element and make allegations 
of parallel conduct to show it. 
3. Changes to Pleading under this Step 
As I did after step one, I pause here to note why this step should 
still be unobjectionable to critics of the plausibility inquiry.  First, for a 
cause of action where all the elements are directly perceptible and the 
plaintiff directly pleads each element with sensory perceptible 
allegations, a court need not and cannot engage in the plausibility 
inquiry.  As Professor Steinman has pointed out, in this situation the 
plausibility inquiry ―vanishes completely.‖
187
 
Second, a court cannot require a plaintiff to produce evidence to 
back up non-conclusory allegations in the complaint.  It is important to 
note that the definition of conclusory does not require sensory-perceived 
allegations, but instead sensory-perceptible allegations.  Confronted with 
Iqbal‘s allegations, I personally would find it ―unrealistic‖
188
 that he had 
himself perceived those discussions in the weeks after September 11—
i.e., he had heard Ashcroft and Mueller discussing the policy, or had 
heard Ashcroft‘s and Mueller‘s phone calls, or read their emails.  I 
would also be surprised to find out that the plaintiff had heard this 
information from someone else that had actually perceived these 
allegations.  But none of this matters.  As the Supreme Court stated: ―To 
be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they 
are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of 
respondent‘s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, 
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.‖
189
 
Third, I suggest also that the above definition of conclusory, 
although not compelled by, is nonetheless consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent before Twombly and Iqbal.  In Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
the plaintiffs alleged that they ―suffered damage[s].‖
190
  Suffering 
economic damages is a directly perceptible allegation—this can be seen 
through a lower resale price.  But the plaintiffs pleaded that allegation as 
though it was only indirectly perceptible.  This allegation is conclusory 
 
 187. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316.  But, where a plaintiff cannot allege an element of a 
cause of action directly—either because the element is only indirectly perceptible, or because the 
plaintiff pleads the allegations as a conclusion and pleads the element indirectly with other sensory-
perceptible allegations—the court must then proceed to the plausibility analysis on those specific 
elements. 
 188. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005). 
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in the same way that the use of the term ―agreement‖ was conclusory in 
Twombly.
191
  What remains, then, is the discussion of plausibility. 
C. Plausibility 
As noted above, up until this point, Twombly and Iqbal have not 
significantly changed pleading practice and have not yet introduced the 
feared subjectivity into pleading practice.  Again, under the first two 
steps outlined above, when confronted with a motion to dismiss, a court 
should first identify the elements of a claim for relief.  A court should 
then see if the elements of the claim are directly perceptible, and if so, 
whether the plaintiff has directly pleaded those elements with sensory-
perceptible allegations.  In these types of claims a court cannot engage 
in the plausibility inquiry and must deny the motion to dismiss. 
But sometimes a claim will contain elements that cannot be directly 
perceived, or a plaintiff will plead a directly perceptible element only 
indirectly.  In these situations, a court must examine whether the 
sensory-perceptible allegations that indirectly speak to the missing 
element plausibly suggest that the plaintiff will be able to prove the 
missing element. 
This third step—a court‘s analysis of whether the non-conclusory 
allegations that indirectly speak to an element of a cause of action—is 
the plausibility inquiry.  Before addressing this inquiry, however, I will 
first pause to point out several of the practicalities that are involved in 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice that tend to forestall the necessity of the 
plausibility inquiry.  This discussion is intended to answer the fears that 
Twombly has introduced ―a wild card . . . at the threshold stage of civil 
process through which all litigation must pass.‖
192
 
1. Getting to Plausibility 
In Taming Twombly, Professor Edward Harnett describes how 
district judges can forestall the plausibility inquiry.  He points out that, 
although ―most commentators[] seem to assume that surviving a 
12(b)(6) motion is a prerequisite to discovery, this is simply not the 
case.‖
193
  He continues that, ―the mere filing of a motion to dismiss does 
 
 191. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.11 (2007). 
 192. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
 193. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 507. 
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not trigger a stay of discovery . . . ‗Discovery need not cease during the 
pendency of a motion to dismiss.‘‖
194
 
A district court that is generally sympathetic to a plaintiff‘s 
complaint, but unsure whether the complaint could survive the 
plausibility analysis, simply ―could . . . delay decision on the motion to 
dismiss.‖
195
  If a court sits on the motion to dismiss, ―by the time 
briefing and argument on the motion to dismiss is complete, the plaintiff 
will have had an opportunity to obtain discovery to support those 
allegations as to which discovery was needed.‖
196
  If this discovery 
while the motion is pending turns up evidence that supports the 
plaintiff‘s allegations, a court would likely find that ―justice so requires‖ 
granting ―leave‖ to amend the complaint to include the new 
allegations.
197
  Hartnett also points out that Rule 12(i) ―authorize[s] a 
district court to defer hearing and decision on a 12(b)(6) motion until 
trial.‖
198
 
Even if a district court does entirely dismiss the plaintiff‘s 
complaint, the district court can do so with leave to amend the 
complaint.  This is, in fact, the ―commonly followed‖ practice.
199
  
Indeed, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court specifically provided for this option: 
―The Court of Appeals should decide in the first instance whether to 
 
 194. Id. at 507 (quoting SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 945 n.11 
(7th Cir. 1988)).  Hartnett notes that under Rule 26(c), a court may ―for good cause[] issue an order . 
. . forbidding . . . discovery.‖  Id. at 507-08.  He points out, though, that the ―issuance of such a stay 
is not routine.‖  Id.  Hartnett additionally notes that, if courts would normally grant a stay of 
discovery while a motion to dismiss was pending, this ―would be to treat a unique provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 as if it applied to all cases.‖  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
77z-1(b)(1) (2006)). 
 195. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 509.  Hartnett also notes, however, that in some cases a 
defendant may simultaneously file a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay discovery.  Id.  
Alternatively, he points out that a defendant may simply ―stonewall‖ discovery, a behavior which a 
plaintiff may not be able to redress with a motion to compel before the district court makes a 
decision on the motion to dismiss.  Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at n.166; FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 198. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 511; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (―If a party so moves, any defense 
listed in Rule 12(b)(1)-(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion— . . . must be heard and 
decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.‖). 
 199. See 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 n.98 (3d ed.) and accompanying text. 
A wise judicial practice (and one that is commonly followed) would be to allow at least 
one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears because 
except in unusual circumstances it is unlikely that the district court will be able to 
determine conclusively on the face of a defective pleading whether the plaintiff actually 
can state a claim for relief. 
Id.  As a matter of course, plaintiff‘s attorneys, when opposing a motion to dismiss, should ask for 
the court‘s leave to amend if the court determines that the complaint cannot state a claim. 
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remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend 
his deficient complaint.‖
200
 
Additionally, a motion to dismiss does not always dispose of the 
plaintiff‘s entire action.  On those claims that survive the partial 
dismissal, which generally will form part of the same set of transactions 
and occurrences, continued discovery may reveal evidence that would 
demonstrate that ―justice so requires‖
201
 leave to amend the complaint to 
replead those previously dismissed claims.  Hartnett also notes that a 
district court‘s discretion to help along a deficient claim is ―largely 
unreviewable.‖
 202
 
Some cases will, however, require a court to engage in the 
plausibility inquiry. 
2. Plausibility 
Confronted with the necessity of the plausibility inquiry, a court 
should carefully examine the complaint and find those allegations that 
speak to the element indirectly.  As in Iqbal, it should not be necessary 
for the plaintiff to specifically link within the complaint which 
allegations speak to which elements.
203
  A court should look at the 
allegations cumulatively.  The court should then determine whether it 
can ―draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.‖
204
  A court faced with this decision will be 
required to apply some amount of ―judicial experience and common 
sense.‖
205
  This is where the inquiry becomes problematic. 
How a court determines whether the inference is reasonable is a 
difficult question.  Professor Bone suggests that, in making this 
determination, a court will compare the alleged conduct with a baseline 
of conduct and see if the alleged conduct ―differ[s] in some significant 
 
 200. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
 201. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
 202. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 513.  ―The major exception to this principle is when qualified 
immunity is in play.‖  Id.  This explains the language in Iqbal that suggests that discovery should 
not proceed during a motion to dismiss.  See id. 
 203. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52. 
 204. Id. at 1949. 
 205. Id. at 1950.  Professor Scott Dodson notes an interesting aspect of Twombly that remains 
unsettled: 
[W]ho will determine (and under what standards) what is ―plausible‖ or not? . . . May a 
defendant moving to dismiss support his motion with expert opinions that the plaintiffs‘ 
allegations are not plausible?  Must a plaintiff oppose the motion with his own expert‘s 
contrary opinions?  Must the trial court then convert the motion into one for summary 
judgment? 
Dodson, supra note 19, at 142. 
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way from what usually occurs in the baseline and differ[s] in a way that 
supports a higher probability of wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated 
with the baseline conduct.‖
206
  Professor Bone, although generally 
concluding that the ―plausibility standard marks only a modest departure 
from traditional notice pleading,‖ recognizes that ―[d]efining the 
appropriate baseline will not always be easy, and in any event it involves 
a normative judgment.‖
207
  This is about as accurate of a description of 
the analysis as possible.  A judge, and the Supreme Court, ―could never 
succeed in intelligibly‖ defining the line between speculative and 
plausible, but I think that most judges will ―know it when [they] see 
it.‖
208
  I pause here to point out that excepting the disagreement on the 
conclusory nature of several of the allegations, there was surprising 
uniformity in the Justices‘ interpretation of the plausibility inquiry in 
Twombly (a 7–2 decision) and Iqbal (9–0). 
I acknowledge here that the plausibility inquiry does involve some 
subjectivity in the use of judicial experience and common sense.  In the 
next section, I will argue that this subjectivity is not as problematic as 
some have suggested. 
3. Recasting Twombly and Iqbal:  Defending Plausibility Pleading 
and Confronting Its Critics 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires a plaintiff to have a 
―belief[] formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . 
[that] the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically 
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
 
 206. See Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13 at 885-86. 
By a ‗baseline,‘ I mean the normal state of affairs for situations of the same general type 
as those described in the complaint.  The probability of wrongdoing for baseline conduct 
is not necessarily zero, but is should be very small, for otherwise the conduct in question 
would not be part of a socially acceptable baseline. 
Id.  Bone explains that he read Twombly as a case determined by what baseline is applied to the 
conduct of the telecommunications companies.  See id. at 885. 
It is tempting to conclude that there must be something amiss when competing firms stay 
out of one another‘s markets and use common techniques to deter entry into their own. 
But this is an example of a baseline problem. Parallel conduct of this sort might seem 
odd when compared to the baseline of competitive behavior in general. But this is the 
wrong baseline for the Twombly case. The correct baseline is competitive behavior under 
the particular conditions of the telecommunications market. And compared to that 
baseline, there is nothing necessarily odd about what the defendants are doing. 
Id. 
 207. See Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 935, 887. 
 208. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice 
Breyer provides a modern-day version of this quotation in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 
(2005) (―I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.‖). 
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opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .‖
209
  When Rule 
11 speaks of ―factual contentions‖ it does not have the same definition as 
the definition of non-conclusory that I have provided above.  Factual 
contentions under Rule 11 are those contentions that are not legal 
conclusions.  Under Rule 11, a defendant‘s state of mind or purpose, 
then, is a factual contention. 
Under Rule 11, when a plaintiff alleges that a group of defendants 
formed a conspiracy, or alleges that a defendant had a discriminatory 
motive, a plaintiff is not required to have evidentiary support for these 
contentions.  But a plaintiff is required to have a reasonable belief that 
these factual contentions will ―likely have evidentiary support.‖
210
  This 
makes sense—one would not normally expect an individual who got 
fired to file a discrimination claim for no reason.  The individual will 
have some basis for believing that the termination was discriminatory. 
Twombly and Iqbal require a plaintiff to plead that basis.
211
  This 
must be done in non-conclusory (sensory-perceptible) allegations, but 
this should be no insuperable hurdle for a plaintiff; for those elements of 
a claim that a plaintiff does not, or cannot (like discriminatory purpose) 
directly allege in a sensory-perceptible allegation, the plaintiff must have 
some sensory-perceptible reason for believing that the element is 
satisfied.  To make the point more clear, I draw again on the above 
provided hypothetical allegations of discrimination: 
1.  Defendant fired Plaintiff because she was a woman. 
2.  During a performance review, Defendant stated that clients have 
complained about doing business with a woman. 
3.  Plaintiff heard Defendant make a joke and laugh when she exited the 
room. 
4.  Defendant failed to use gender-neutral language in his inter-office 
memoranda. 
5.  Defendant fired Plaintiff because of his hostility to women which he 
demonstrated by his constant telling of sexist jokes in the office. 
A plaintiff can make the allegation that Defendant fired her because 
she was a woman.  But she cannot plead this in directly perceptible 
allegations.  By filing the suit though, she believes that the allegation of 
discrimination in Allegation 1 will likely have evidentiary support.  Why 
 
 209. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Professor Hoffman has previously suggested that plausibility ―is probably close—if not 
(at least sometimes) equivalent—to the Rule 11(b)(3) proscription against asserting claims for 
which there is no evidentiary support and no likelihood of evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further discovery.‖  Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1253-54. 
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does she believe this—because of the additional sensory-perceptible 
allegations two through five.  A court must accept that all of these things 
physically happened (aside from the non-conclusory part of allegation 
5).  The court will then evaluate whether the plaintiff has accurately 
predicted whether she will likely find evidence of discrimination. 
Under Twombly and Iqbal, then, a Court is simply evaluating 
whether the plaintiff has adequately appraised her claim.  The Court is 
not making any factual determination or weighing any credibility.  The 
Court is not requiring a plaintiff to produce evidence to back up her 
well-pleaded allegations.  Instead, the Court is determining whether the 
plaintiff‘s reasons for believing that she was discriminated against 
suggest that she will be entitled to relief.  A plaintiff does not have a new 
evidentiary burden under Twombly and Iqbal.  Instead, a plaintiff must 
reveal to the court what she is already required to have under Rule 11. 
The circumstances under which plausibility pleading will lead to a 
different result than the traditional system of notice pleading are limited.  
This will only occur when a court disagrees with a plaintiff on whether 
her reasons for bringing a claim suggest liability.  Twombly and Iqbal 
should only be feared on policy grounds if one assumes that a plaintiff as 
a better ability than a disinterested judge to gauge whether her claim is 
more than speculative.  To put it another way, is it fair to subject a 
defendant to legal costs and the costs of discovery when a plaintiff has 
only a hunch?
212
  In Rule 8(a)‘s terms, a pleading without the plaintiff‘s 
reasons for believing that the allegation will likely have evidentiary 
support fails to ―show[]‖ that the plaintiff is ―entitled to relief.‖
213
 
Professor Steinman has questioned whether it is appropriate to use 
Rule 11‘s certification requirement as a pleading standard.  Rule 11 
already has its own enforcement mechanism, which is sanctions, and 
courts should not commandeer that standard into the 12(b)(6) 
adjudication.
214
  While this may be a valid criticism, my argument is 
merely that Twombly and Iqbal do not, practically, require anything new 
 
 212. Cf. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 900 (―When proceduralists discuss 
pleading standards, they tend to assume that fairness applies just to plaintiffs and that any pleading 
standard stricter than liberal notice pleading can be justified only on efficiency grounds.‖).  Granted, 
though, a court will end up dismissing a case on a mere hunch.  But there are still many protections 
of plaintiffs in place—need to take the non-conclusory allegations as true—that are in the plaintiff‘s 
favor, and, anyway, it seems better to have a neutral third-party—the judge—make this decision 
than the interested plaintiff. 
 213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 214. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1331-32 (―Using Rule 11 as a basis for requiring 
supportive allegations at the pleadings phase would, therefore, conflate two separate procedural 
issues, contrary to the text and structure of the Federal Rules.‖). 
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of plaintiffs.  Additionally, this requirement can be tenably derived from 
Rule 8(a)‘s language quoted above. 
Professor Spencer suggests that the rules of pleading were not 
intended to screen out claims at the pleading stage,
215
 except when the 
complaint fails to give the defendant adequate notice.  Spencer also 
argues that the plausibility pleading standard ―is out of step with the 
larger matrix of rules governing procedure in federal civil cases.‖
216
  He 
suggests that ―although Rule 11(b) allows for the possibility that the 
pleader will require discovery to obtain supportive facts, plausibility 
pleading does not make such an allowance.‖
217
  Rather, plaintiffs are 
required to offer such facts at the pleading phase before discovery may 
occur.‖
218
  This characterization, however, misconceives the plausibility 
inquiry.  Plaintiffs may still plead allegations on which they do not have 
supporting facts but on which they anticipate finding facts.  Plausibility 
simply makes the plaintiffs tell the court why he or she thinks that the 
facts will be uncovered.  The plaintiff does not, under plausibility 
pleading, need the ultimate facts to plead a valid claim—this was 
recognized in Twombly itself, where the Court provided examples of 
parallel conduct (sensory-perceptible allegations that speak indirectly to 
an agreement) that would state a valid claim despite a plaintiff‘s inability 
to allege an actual agreement.
219
 
Additionally, the Federal Rules certainly contemplate some case 
screening function at the pleading stage.  Although the Supreme Court 
has traditionally focused on the notice function of the rules, if the 
drafters really believed that the pleadings should not be used to screen 
out unmeritorious cases, why allow a defendant to move to dismiss for 
―failure to state a claim‖?
220
  The Rule does not allow dismissal for 
―failure to give notice.‖  Indeed, the rule expressly provides a procedural 
vehicle to remedy a pleading that is not sufficiently specific to give 
notice:  ―A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading . 
. . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably 
prepare a response.‖
221
  If notice was the only goal of the complaint, 
Rule 12(e) would sufficiently address this—regardless of the merit of a 
 
 215. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 480. 
 216. Id. at 469. 
 217. Id. at 471. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.4 (2007) (providing the example 
of ―complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time 
by multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason‖) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 220. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 221. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). 
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plaintiff‘s complaint, a defendant will have notice of exactly what events 
or transactions the plaintiff is attempting to sue upon. 
In dissent in Twombly, Justice Stevens stated that the Court‘s 
approach was inconsistent with the Forms appended to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.
222
  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84, ―[t]he 
forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the 
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.‖
223
  Form 11
224
 is a 
Complaint for Negligence and states: 
1.  On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff. 
2.  As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, 
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of 
$____. 
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for $___, 
plus costs.
 225
 
The majority in Twombly suggested that its approach was indeed 
consistent with this Form.
226
  Professor Spencer suggests that the Form 
―reveals that pleading facts that establish the defendant‘s negligence—
such as the defendant‘s use of a cell phone while driving, operation of 
the vehicle at excessive speed, or failure to wear required prescription 
spectacles—are not necessary to state a claim.‖
227
  Requiring a plaintiff 
to plead these facts, according to Spencer, would be a problem because 
―there would be no way for unwitting victims who are blindsided by 
wayward vehicles to state their claims.‖
228
  This, however, overstates a 
plaintiff‘s lack of knowledge.  The plaintiff must have, under Rule 11, 
some reason to believe that the defendant drove negligently.  This may 
simply be that she was hit.  She will, however, know her own actions, 
i.e., whether she was lawfully crossing the street at the time of the 
accident. 
 
 222. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575-76.   
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (emphasis added). 
 224. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.  Some of the commentary on Twombly and Iqbal refers to this as 
Form 9.  See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575-76.  The different number is the result of recent style 
amendments in the Rules.  Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 883 n.47 (―After the 
recent style amendments, Form 9—a model complaint for automobile negligence—appears as Form 
11 and the specific date and location reference in the original have been replaced with 
placeholders.‖) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11). 
 225. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 226. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
 227. Spencer, Understanding Pleading, supra note 173, at 26. 
 228. Id. at 27. 
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But it is true that the plaintiff may not be able to specifically allege 
what that negligent behavior was.  A court, evaluating this complaint, 
would have to make a judgment as to whether plaintiff‘s being hit by a 
car raises the inference of negligence above the speculative level.  Most 
would say ―yes.‖  Some may say ―no‖—which is the difficulty in 
Twombly and Iqbal.  This is fairly criticized as a subjective judgment—a 
judgment based on judicial experience and common sense.  But the 
danger that this presents (that a judge‘s subjective judgment will result 
in the dismissal of a potentially meritorious suit) is a remote danger.  
This danger, unlike a court‘s ability to help along a deficient claim, is 
also subject to judicial review and the above-described three-step 
framework will ensure that district judges make the plausibility inquiry 
transparently
229
 to facilitate this review.  And this danger must be 
evaluated against the alternative system, where a plaintiff can subject a 
defendant to discovery costs by concealing her reasons for filing suit 
from the court. 
Professor Spencer has summarized what he sees as the conclusion 
that can be drawn from a dismissal based on the plausibility inquiry: 
―After a Twombly dismissal, observers can only say, ‗He might have had 
a claim but he failed to ‗prove‘ it.‘  One cannot say, ‗He did not have a 
claim‘ or ‗His claim was groundless.‘‖
230
  This mischaracterizes the 
inquiry.  Rather, after a Twombly dismissal, one can say ―He may have a 
claim but he has no good reason to think so.‖ 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Above I have proposed a three-step process to aid courts in 
adjudication of a motion to dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal.  This 
approach is designed (1) to ensure that the plausibility inquiry is 
relegated to its proper role as an inquiry of last resort and (2) to ensure 
that, when necessary, the plausibility inquiry will be done transparently 
to facilitate judicial review.  This approach helps to ameliorate many of 
the criticisms of Twombly, as can a district judge‘s exercise of case 
management discretion to help insufficient claims along. 
I also conclude, however, that the plausibility inquiry, in light of 
Rule 11, can provide a helpful case-screening function that is preferable 
to the alternative pleading system where a plaintiff‘s appraisal of her 
 
 229. Additionally, if the plausibility inquiry really does, as Professor Bone describes, involve a 
comparison of the alleged conduct with a baseline of normal conduct, there will likely be some 
pressure on judges to avoid dismissing claims that allege lawful but politically incorrect action.  
Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, supra note 13, at 882. 
 230. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 483. 
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own claim opens the doors to federal court without any judicial 
involvement. 
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